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According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or 
in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. 
Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue 
of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an 
independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is 
argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice 
when they decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical 
conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their 
conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should 
apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection 
does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather 
acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from 
acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for 









According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or 
in ‘freedom of conscience’. Consequently, conscientious objection is tolerated out of 
respect for the objector's autonomy, which is in turn linked to their ability to 
independently choose their beliefs and commitments. 
This paper advances two arguments. First, it is argued that one cannot really 
choose whether or not to act upon one’s deepest beliefs, and second one cannot really 
choose what one’s deepest beliefs will be. Consequently, the actions of the typical 
conscientious objector are reflective of an inability to choose. This argument results in 
two conclusions. The first conclusion is that, from an analytical point of view, 
tolerating conscientious objection does not in the typical case reflect respect for the 
conscientious objector’s autonomy but rather acknowledges his lack of real ability to 
choose his conscience and to refrain from acting upon his conscience. The second 
conclusion is that, from a normative point of view, the lack of real choice always 
provides a reason for tolerating conscientious objection albeit not necessarily a 
conclusive or prevailing reason or even a strong one.    
Even though the concept of ‘conscience’ lies at the core of this paper we will 
not answer the question ‘What is conscience?’. We will not discuss the origins of the 
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concept,1 or its contemporary meaning and disagreements about it.2 We will also 
refrain from discussing the (alleged?) change from regarding conscientious objections 
mainly as religiously motivated to seeing them mainly as secularly or non-religiously 
motivated.3 For the purpose of this paper, and without trying to defend this assertion, 
we will perceive ‘conscience’ as a source of ‘higher demands’ to which a person sees 
himself as subordinate. We will assume that a person’s conscience consists of their 
deepest moral beliefs which provide for them uniquely strong or weighty reasons for 
doing X or refraining from doing X.4 These ‘conscientious reasons’ are often 
conclusive and are very rarely overridden by conflicting reasons or excluded from the 
balance of reasons by exclusionary reasons. ‘Conscientious reasons’ can in fact be 
perceived as exclusionary reasons themselves. Exclusionary reasons exclude first-
order reasons from the balance of reasons, which then rests upon the non-excluded 
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would like to thank Megan Davidson for her research assistance. We benefited from thoughtful 
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University School of Law’s work-in-progress seminar. We are also thankful for the challenging 
comments given by the paper’s anonymous reviewers.    
1 These origins are rooted in the Latin word Conscientia and in the Greek concepts (that changed their 
meanings over the years) of syneidesis and synderesis; see, for example: E D'arcy, Conscience and Its 
Right to Freedom (1961); H Costigance, 'A History of the Western Idea of Conscience' in J Hoose (ed) 
Conscience in World Religions (1999) 3, 12, 18-19, where the views of Aquinas, Martin Luther, Lewis 
Rambo and others are discussed; David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (OUP, 1986) 85-95, 
where the views of John Locke and Pierre Bayle are discussed. For Germain Grisez’s distinction 
between ‘personal conscience’, ‘cultural conscience’ and ‘absolute conscience’, see: G Grisez, The 
Way of the Lord Jesus: I: Christian Moral Principles (1983) 73-96, and D Leal, 'Against Conscience: 
A Protestant View' in J Hoose (ed) Conscience in World Religions (1999) 27-28.    
2 LM Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience (2001) 107-114; on page 
107 however Hammer states that ‘… from a phenomenological standpoint, it is virtually impossible to 
adequately define the meaning or implications of conscience’. 
3 See, for example: CC Moskos and JW Chambers (eds), The New Conscientious Objection - From 
Sacred to Secular Resistance (1993) chap. 1, 16. 
4 Mark Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Health Care (2011) 4-5. 
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reasons and sometimes also on the exclusionary reason itself.5 It may be the case that 
when one has conscientious reasons for doing X or refraining from doing X, at least 
some conflicting reasons are excluded from the balance of reasons by the 
conscientious reasons and thus do not have any effect on the decision-making process. 
It can also be the case that conscientious reasons simply override most other reasons 
without excluding any of them from the balance of reasons. For the purpose of this 
paper there is no need to decide whether conscientious reasons are uniquely strong 
and weighty first-order reasons or exclusionary reasons, as according to both 
perceptions – and as we apply them here – conscientious reasons are ‘trump cards’ in 
the sense that they almost always determine the final decision. Only in the face of 
severe consequences following an ‘act of conscience’, will a person act contrary to his 
conscientious reasons. This is what differentiates conscientious reasons from other 
moral reasons – and makes the former unique and in fact quite rare. Many people 
have moral beliefs. Many people mistakenly think that their moral beliefs are 
conscientious ones. Those who have moral reasons but will not act upon them even 
when the consequences of acting upon them are not severe, may think that their moral 
reasons are conscientious reasons but they will be wrong. People who claim they have 
conscientious reasons not to eat meat, for example, but do so anyway with the absence 
of threat or severe sanctions, may have moral reasons not to eat meat, but not 
conscientious ones. Ignoring the distinction between conscientious reasons and other 
moral reasons will result in a very broad and therefore unusable definition of 
conscience and freedom of conscience. To take one example, if all moral reasons are 
																																								 																				
5 For the difference between first order and second order reasons see J. Raz Practical Reasons and 
Norms (2nd edition, 1999) 35 – 36, 39 - 40.
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conscientious reasons, then conscientious objection becomes merely moral objection. 
Since it is plainly impossible to exempt all ‘moral objectors’ from the application of 
the law, the inevitable result will be that conscientious exemptions will never be 
granted. Ignoring the distinction between conscientious reasons and moral reasons 
will therefore undermine the moral and legal importance of freedom of conscience. 
The only possible way for a person to know whether her reasons are conscientious or 
merely moral is to ask herself if she will be willing to act upon these reasons even in 
the face of severe sanctions or while taking the risk of suffering severe consequences.        
Since conscientious reasons result from one’s deepest moral beliefs, acting against 
them results in great harm to one’s moral personhood and moral integrity.6 Note that 
in assuming conscientious reasons to be uniquely strong or weighty for the individual 
we do not assume that the individual is right to afford them that weight or strength. In 
other words, we hold that there is a distinction between what the individual believes 
to be the case with respect to her conscientious reasons and what is normatively 
appropriate. This distinction becomes important both when we defend our argument 
that the typical conscientious objector lacks choice and when we address the 
normative implications of that argument. 
Acting upon one’s conscience may find expression in illegal acts or omissions. 
This is the case of conscientious objection. For the purpose of this paper we will refer 
to conscientious objection as a private act (or omission) which is based on 
conscientious reasons and whose only purpose is to distance the objector from acting 
																																								 																				
6 For a good discussion of various perceptions of ‘moral personhood’ see J.A. Frimer and L.J. Walker 
‘Towards a New Paradigm of Moral Personhood’ 37(3) Journal of Moral Education (2008) 333; G.E. 
Scott, Moral Personhood: An Essay in the Philosophy of Moral Psychology (Sunny Series in Ethical 
Theory, 1990). For the purpose of this paper we assume that moral personhood entails some causal 
connection between holding moral views and acting upon these views.     
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according to a legal demand. Conscientious objection is a private act in the sense that 
it is not political. It does not aim to change the legal rule itself or to challenge the 
rule-making system. Its sole purpose is to allow the conscientious objector to follow 
his conscience by disobeying legal rules which contradict his conscience. 
Conscientious objection may also be a private act in the sense that the objector may 
prefer not to make his objection public. In certain cases making the objection public 
will run against the objector’s interest. The objector may wish to commit a discrete 
act of objection to obey the legal rule without being caught or to seek an exemption 
from the legal rule by quietly and discretely negotiating with the authorities. This is 
not to say that conscientious objection is a private act by its nature. Public objection 
does not necessarily deny its conscientious nature but here we assume, without trying 
to defend this argument, that even when a conscientious objection is public in the 
sense that it is publicized, its purpose is still private rather than political in the sense 
that its purpose is selfish – to distance the objector from the demand of the law 
without aiming to change the law itself. This is the difference between conscientious 
objection and civil disobedience. The latter is a public, political act, whose purpose is 
to bring about a change in the law or in existing policies. Thus, conscientious 
objection is a breach of a law that the agent is conscientiously prohibited from 
obeying, whereas civil disobedience is politically motivated.7      
 
																																								 																				
7 For a similar distinction see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (1979) chapters 14 and 15. Even 
though conscientious objection and civil disobedience are partly overlapping, we will ignore this point 
here and will only refer our arguments to paradigmatic cases of conscientious objection.  
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2.	 Conscientious	 objection,	 autonomy	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 choice	
argument	
According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy and 
is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy.8 This is allied to another 
common view which is that conscientious objection is grounded in ‘moral integrity’ 
or ‘personal integrity’ – thus should be tolerated out of respect for the objector’s 
moral integrity. While this latter view is sound, most of those who subscribe to it 
wrongly emphasise the importance of respecting or tolerating people’s autonomous 
choices, that is choices with regard to having a certain conscience and acting upon it.9 
We argue that this view is flawed. Autonomy or independent choice is not the 
appropriate ground for tolerating conscientious objection: most instances of 
conscientious objection are reflective of lack of autonomy and independent choice 
and so their toleration should not be grounded in respect for autonomy and 
independent choice. 
The concept of autonomy is much disputed in the literature. Here we adopt a 
broadly Razian conception of autonomy.10 According to such a conception, autonomy 
implies that (i) people have minimal rationality (i.e. they are able to set goals and 
comprehend the means of achieving those goals); (ii) people have an adequate range 
																																								 																				
8 Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction – The case for Civil Disobedience (2012) 128-139, 
167-168, 171-172. 
9 B Leiter, ‘Why Tolerate Religion?’ 25 Constitutional Commentary (2008) 1, 25; Daniel Sulmasy, 
‘What is Conscience and Why is Respect for it So Important?’ 29(3) Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics (2008) 135, 138; Sean Murphy and Stephen Genuis, ‘Freedom of Conscience in Health Care: 
Distinctions and Limits’ 10 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (2013) 347; Wicclair (n4). 
10 J Raz The Morality of Freedom (1986) chapters 14 and 15; J Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration and the 
Harm Principle' in R Gavison (ed) Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (1987) 313. Weaker 
versions of autonomy are discussed later in relation to specific objections to our position. 
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of valuable options from which they are able to choose; and (iii) people are 
appropriately independent while exercising those choices (i.e. that they are free from 
outside determination, manipulation and coercion). Thus, we take it that in 
emphasising autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious 
objection, defenders of the common view are implying that the conscientious objector 
exercises a rational independent choice from a range of valuable options, just as 
freedom of conscience implies that one should be free to choose one’s conscience and 
act upon it.11   
There are two problems with this view. First, one does not always have a 
meaningful, independent choice as to whether to act upon one’s beliefs. One also does 
not always have a meaningful, independent choice as to which action is best in light 
of one’s belief. This is particularly true of the typical conscientious objector. Second, 
one does not really independently choose one’s deepest beliefs (i.e. the sources of 
one’s conscientious commitments). It should be noted that Raz’s perception of 
autonomy focuses on being free from external coercion. Here, and as will be 
explained in detail below, we argue that a person that feels compelled to act in a 
certain way because of conscientious reasons that result from a conscience that was 
never chosen, is subject to internal coercion that denies or diminishes his autonomy. 
Consequently, respect for the typical conscientious objector is not best thought of as 
arising from respect for autonomy. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious 
																																								 																				
11 It worth noting here that a distinction can be drawn between freedom, as a local concept applying to 
particular moments of decision, and autonomy as a global concept, applying across an extended 
temporal swathe of an individual’s life. See G Dworkin, ‘The Concept of Autonomy’ (1981) 12/13 
Grazer Philosophische Studien 203-213. Not everyone embraces this distinction but, in any event, our 




objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating 
conscientious objection does not typically reflect respect for the conscientious 
objector’s freedom to choose but rather acknowledges the lack of real ability to 
choose one’s conscience and to refrain from acting upon one’s conscience, and the 
lack of adequate range of valuable options to choose from.  
To defend this argument, it is useful to break the typical case of conscientious 
objection up into two distinct timeframes. The first, which we shall call T1, is the time 
at which the conscientious objector makes a decision as to whether to act in 
accordance with their conscience. So understood, T1 encompasses a localised moment 
or series of moments in time. The second, which we shall call T0, is the time over 
which the conscientious objector develops their conscientious commitments. So 
understood, T0 can encompass a much more extended series of moments in time. It is 
our contention that the typical conscientious objector lacks independent choice over 
both timeframes.  
It is important to note at the outset that this argument concerns the typical 
conscientious objector and not every possible instance of conscientious objection. We 
concede at points in the following discussion that certain conceptions of autonomy 
might allow for rare cases in which conscientious objection does emanate from 
autonomy. We respond, however, by arguing that in order to embrace these cases one 
must engage in considerable conceptual manoeuvrings that are a long way from the 
most common-sense understandings of autonomy and that even then doing so would 
limit conscientious objection to rare instances that would be counterintuitive because 
they would exclude the majority of cases that we typically group under that 
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description. Consequently, we submit that it is more plausible to simply reconceive 
the conceptual basis on which conscientious objections are tolerated. 
 
2.1	 –	 The	 Lack	 of	 Real	 Choice	 in	 Acting	 in	 Accordance	 with	 One’s	
Conscience	
 
We start by setting out the argument in relation to the lack of real choice at T1. The 
decisional dynamic in such a situation is demonstrated by two typical cases. The first 
is the case of having to decide between (a) not acting upon one’s conscience and (b) 
suffering an exceptionally severe sanction should one act upon it (e.g., a Muslim 
woman who feels compelled by her religious conscience to wear a veil and faces a 
criminal law that utterly prohibits the wearing of a veil and imposes long 
imprisonment periods as sanctions). The second is the case when one has to decide 
whether to (a) not act upon one’s conscience and consequently enjoy various types of 
benefits or (b) act upon it and thereby lose these benefits (e.g., a Muslim woman 
whose religious conscience compels her to wear a veil, facing a law that utterly 
prohibits wearing a veil in free-tuition public universities but not in numerous 
expensive private ones). The sanctions in both cases are severe because either the 
woman acts from conscientious commitments and is punished or excluded from some 
benefit; or she reneges on the commitments that are core to her sense of identity and 
moral purpose, forcing some serious rethinking of who or what she is.  
In both cases, and if the objection to removing the veil is a conscientious one, 
we argue that the Muslim woman does not have an independent choice from a 
valuable range of options. If, as is most likely, she decides to wear the veil it will be 
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because the exceptional weight afforded to her conscientious reasons determines this 
decision.12 In other words, because at T1 her faculty of choice was fixed in such a 
way as to render openness to and choice among the available options effectively 
impossible, she has no choice but to wear the veil. She is, in fact, compelled by her 
conscience to wear the veil.  
It may be argued that in both veil cases (conscience vs. threat; conscience vs. 
forgone benefit), if the Muslim woman decides to wear the veil after all, she would 
base her decision on her assessment of the reasons that apply to her and on the weight 
she would accord to these reasons. It may also be argued that even if she feels 
compelled to choose that way, it is her take on reason that is compelling her – and that 
to say otherwise is to infantilise her or to undermine her agency.  
We, however, argue that the reasons that conscientious objectors have for 
acting in a certain way – and the weight that is accorded to these reasons – are not 
really chosen but rather result from ‘fixed points’ which are beyond their control and 
which allow them or prevent them from weighing and evaluating the alternatives. 
This point will be elaborated in section 2.2 below, where we discuss the lack of real 
choice over the content of one’s conscience. Here, suffice it to say that the fact a 
person has reasons for acting in a certain way, and can reason their decision and 
justify it, does not entail or reflect choice, freedom or autonomy. Moreover, the lack 
of real choice both at T0 and T1 does not infantilise the conscientious objector or 
																																								 																				
12 Lest there be any confusion: to call it a decision should not be taken to imply that there is involved 
an intelligible, independent autonomous choice. We assume that everyone faces decision problems in 
life – i.e. contexts in which multiple outcomes are, at least, epistemically conceivable. To say that 
someone ‘decides’ in our view simply means that when confronted by these decision problems the 
agent realises one of these epistemically conceivable outcomes. It could be that only one outcome was 
ever realisable, but even if that weren’t the case, and more than one was realisable, it would not follow 
that the agent has exercised an autonomous choice. If someone points a gun to your head you may 
‘decide’ to follow their instructions, but the decision is not an exercise of autonomous choice.  
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undermine their agency – as long as they can reason their decision. Lack of real 
choice in terms of having ‘fixed points’ which are beyond our control and which 
allow us or prevent us from weighing and evaluating the alternatives – does not 
prevent us from reasoning our decisions. It merely dictates the way in which we 
reason our decisions – and the decisions themselves.     
Alternatively, if the Muslim woman decides to act against her conscience in 
order to avoid the exceptionally severe sanction, she will do so because she lacks an 
adequate range of valuable options and has simply been coerced into acting against 
her conscience. Formally, it would seem like the woman’s ‘choice’ meets the 
conditions for coercion: the legal system threatens to make her extremely or 
considerably worse off than she would otherwise be unless she drops her 
conscientious commitments. And if we are coerced into doing X, we would not be 
inclined to say that we chose to act or that our choice was an autonomous one (free 
from external manipulation or interference).  
In this case, a great harm will be caused to the woman’s moral integrity or 
personhood. Some might dispute this. They may ask: if she was not acting 
autonomously to begin with, how does it do any harm to her moral integrity or 
personhood to act contrary to her commitments?  Doesn’t the claim that damage is 
being done to her integrity or personhood assume that she was acting 
autonomously?.13 As we argue in section 3 below, forcing people to act against their 
non-chosen conscience does result in great harm to their moral integrity or 
personhood. The liberty that conscientious objectors claim is the liberty to have a 
conscience and to act upon it without being subjected to sanctions or to denial of 
																																								 																				
13 This question is taken directly from an anonymous reviewer. 
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meaningful benefits. A non-chosen conscience is not a non-genuine conscience. A 
non-chosen decision to act upon one’s conscience is not less important to the 
decision-maker merely because the decision-maker feels that they have no choice but 
to make that decision. Thus, a claim that harm is being caused to a person’s moral 
integrity or personhood, by coercing them to act against their conscience, does not 
assume that they were autonomous when they acquired their conscience.   
Some may respond that in arguing that the typical conscientious objector lacks 
real choice at T1, we are assuming far too high a standard of autonomy, and, more 
particularly, far too high a standard of what it means to exercise autonomous control 
over particular decisions in one’s life. This is a topic that is much debated in the 
literature on responsibility, control and freedom of choice. It is not possible to do full 
justice to the various positions on choice and control that have been carved out in that 
literature. Nevertheless, we hope to cover as much of the conceptual territory as is 
possible to give a sense of the difficulty of arguing that the conscientious objector has 
an independent choice. We can start by considering two obvious objections to the 
argument just made arising from compatibilist theories of control and autonomy. 
The first objection stems from the reasons-responsive and reason-guiding 
views of compatibilist control.14 Both theories adopt a slightly deflationist view of 
what it is to meaningfully control one’s actions. It is not necessary, according to these 
views, to be able to genuinely choose among reasons for actions or among valuable 
options. All that is required is that one’s decision emanate from a decision-making 
mechanism that is sensitive to changes in the balance of sufficient reasons for and 
																																								 																				
14 Fischer, JM and Ravizza, M Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); and R. Jay 
Wallace Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard: HUP, 1994). 
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against particular actions, or more specifically that it is capable of grasping and acting 
upon sufficient moral reasons for action.15 It could be argued that the decisions of the 
typical conscientious objector satisfy both of these requirements, insofar as they do 
act upon certain types of moral reason (those linked to their conscientious 
commitments) and they can be responsive to changes relating to those reasons. 
But this strikes us as being incorrect. We argue that, even if we do accept this 
deflationist conception of what it takes to be in control of one’s actions, it does not 
follow that the typical conscientious objector exhibits the right kind of reasons-
responsivity. And, furthermore, even if they do display the right kind of responsivity 
it is only because what it means to be reasons responsive is so thin as to result in the 
same normative conclusions toward which we direct our argument in section 3.16 To 
unpack this argument we need to get a clearer sense of what reasons-responsive 
control entails. 
Fischer and Ravizza state that there are three ways in which to understand 
reasons-responsivity: 
 
Strong reasons-responsivity: an agent is strongly reasons-responsive if their 
actions emanate from a deliberative mechanism M and, if there were sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, M would recognize the sufficient reason to do otherwise 
																																								 																				
15 The former is Fischer and Ravizza’s view; the latter is Wallace’s. Fischer and Ravizza define their 
view in counterfactual terms. In other words, a decision-making mechanism M is moderately reasons 
responsive if in at a least some closely related possible worlds involving different mixes of reasons for 
action, it would result in an alternative decision. Quite how strong the counterfactual responsiveness to 
reasons needs to be is unclear in the current debate, though most reject that notion of strong reasons 
responsiveness (which arises when any change in reasons results in an alternative decision). 
16 We are indebted to two anonymous reviewers who highlighted some weaknesses in our original 
formulation of this argument and encouraged us to revise it. 
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and thus choose to do otherwise.  
 
Weak reasons-responsivity: an agent is weakly reasons-responsive just in case 
their actions emanate from a deliberative mechanism M and there is at least one 
possible scenario or possible world in which there is a sufficient reason to 
decide and do otherwise, and M recognizes that reason and issues a different 
action. 
 
Moderate reasons-responsivity: an agent is moderately reasons-responsive if 
their actions emanate from a deliberative mechanism M and M responds to a 
‘rich pattern of reasons, reasons that hang together rationally as a class and fit a 
coherent or sane pattern’17 even if it doesn’t always respond to sufficient 
reasons or even if it doesn’t just do so in an extremely rare class of cases. 
 
There are also three possible failures in responsivity: (i) failure to be receptive to 
reasons (i.e. to hear or understand them); (ii) failure to be reactive to reasons (i.e. to 
afford them their appropriate weight); and (iii) impotence (i.e. an inability to translate 
reasons into actions).  
Although Fischer and Ravizza hold that strong reasons-responsivity is 
sufficient for having control over one’s choices, they do not think it is necessary. 
Indeed, believing that it is necessary has counterintuitive results because it would 
																																								 																				
17 This description is taken from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussion of Compatibilism: 




require a high degree of sensitivity to changes in sufficient reasons for action. This is 
some solace to the conscientious objector since they definitely could not display this 
degree of sensitivity. The nature of their conscientious reasons is such as to outweigh 
or exclude many other sufficient reasons for action. So the question then becomes 
whether weak or moderate reasons responsivity is required for having autonomous 
control and which type of responsivity is displayed by the typical conscientious 
objector.  
It is generally accepted that weak responsivity is too lax a standard. If all that 
is required for control is sensitivity to at least one change in the balance of sufficient 
reasons, it would follow that those in the grip of strong delusions or paranoias are 
reasons responsive. Conscientious objectors probably do display weak reasons-
responsivity since they do indeed act on the basis of (what seem to them to be) 
sufficient reasons for action and probably would be sensitive to at least one change in 
the balance of sufficient reasons for action (for example, if someone convinced them 
that their interpretation of a sacred doctrine or moral principle was flawed). But this is 
little solace if weak responsivity is too lax a standard. 
Moderate reasons-responsivity is the middle course that Fischer and Ravizza 
try to steer. The problem, as with all middle courses, is figuring out what is truly 
moderate. Three conditions have been identified. The first is that it involves 
responsivity to a coherent, rational and sane pattern of reasons. The second is that it 
involves affording reasons an appropriate normative weight in decision-making (this 
means that moderate reasons-responsivity is necessarily evaluative in nature: it 
involves taking a point of view on whether the reasons to which the agent is 
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responsive deserve the kind of weight they are being granted). The third is that the 
decision-making mechanism must satisfy a historical independence condition in order 
to count as being in control. These three conditions all pose problems for someone 
trying to argue that the typical conscientious objector is displaying autonomous 
control over their actions because it is unlikely that the typical conscientious objector 
satisfies all three conditions. 
The first problem is that a deliberative mechanism that is dominated by a 
conscientious reason for action probably does not display rational, coherent and sane 
sensitivity to reasons, at least not in the typical case. Of course, rationality, coherence 
and sanity are highly contested concepts. But even if you embrace those contests, you 
end up with the conclusion that the typical conscientious objector fails to satisfy the 
condition. Limiting ourselves just to rationality, on an economic/decision theoretic 
view all this condition would require would be an ability to identify and respond to 
decision-relevant information, and to act on intelligible, transitive preferences in 
consistent manner across decision problems. On a more normative view it would 
require sensitivity to the right kinds of reasons. Either way we think there is empirical 
evidence suggesting that those with deep conscientious commitments do not act in a 
manner that is rationally sensitive to reasons. Empirical work done on the concept of 
sacred values (a term which is understood to cover moral principles to which 
individuals are deeply committed, and which can be both secular and religious in 
nature) illustrates this point.18 It is found that those with sacred values are not simply 
																																								 																				
18 Atran, S and Axelrod, R. ‘Reframing Sacred Values’ (2008) 24(3) Negotiation Journal 221-246; 
Ginges, J., S. Atran, D. Medin, and K. Shikaki ‘Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent 
political conflict’ (2007) 104 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 7357–7360; Atran, S 
and Ginges, J ‘Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict’ (2012) 336 Science 855-857 
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inclined to ignore changes in the incentives favouring actions that are contrary to their 
values, but that they are likely to become even more entrenched in their commitment 
to those values if those incentives change in favour of alternative actions. In other 
words, they become like gamblers, doubling down on their commitments, even when 
presented with what most others would deem good alternative reasons for action. This 
evidence has been cited as an explanation for the escalation and intractability of 
certain social, ethnic and religious conflicts. While you might, as a reviewer to this 
article did, claim that this doubling-down is exactly what we should expect from 
sacred values, and so is rational, sane and coherent, we think this is counterintuitive. 
To double down in this manner means to become more close-minded and to afford 
less weight to alternative reasons for action than would ordinarily be the case. It is 
hard to see how that could amount to a rational sensitivity (let alone sanity), even on a 
highly instrumentalised view of rationality. In any event, there are other reasons to 
doubt the rational, coherent and sane nature of conscientious commitments. There is 
considerable evidence (discussed in more detail below) to suggest that people’s moral 
commitments are not subject to rational scrutability or defensibility.19 Those with the 
deepest moral commitments are the most selective, most biased, and most tribal when 
it comes to engaging with alternative reasons for actions. They will often ignore or 
manipulate evidence that is contrary to their commitments. It would be difficult to say 
that these patterns of behaviour involve the sane, rational, coherence that is demanded 
by moderate reasons-responsivity.  
One might be able to reject this by leaning on Fischer and Ravizza’s second 
																																								 																				
19 See the discussions of Haidt and moral psychology in section 2.2 
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condition and claiming that the patterns of behaviour are reasons-responsive because 
the conscientious reasons for action are rationally compelling: it is right and proper 
for the conscientious objector to treat their reasons for action as exclusionary or 
conclusive and to seek to undermine or ignore countervailing evidence. This would 
be, prima facie, consistent with moderate reasons responsivity since it is about given 
reasons their due. But this is where the evaluative nature of the second condition of 
moderate responsivity begins to bite. Replying in this way means that one necessarily 
has to evaluate the normative appropriateness of the reasons in question. One is no 
longer detached or impartial. One has to be willing to say that the conscientious 
objector did the right thing by refusing to perform the abortion or blood transfusion 
(or whatever) when faced with alternative reasons for action. This is very different 
from tolerating an objection out of respect for the individual’s choice or autonomy; it 
is tolerating an objection because you respect the way in which they weigh the 
underlying reason for action. This is not far from the view we end up advocating in 
section 3, so our claim is that if you endorse this deflationist account of autonomy, 
and this valenced understanding of what a conscientious reason is, you end up with 
something quite different from the common view.  
In any event, there is another reason for thinking that the typical conscientious 
objector will fail to meet the requirements of moderate reasons-responsivity: their 
deliberative mechanism is unlikely to meet the historical independence requirement, 
for reasons we explain in section 2.2. 
Another possible objection to the claim that there is a lack of choice at T1 
stems from a hierarchical view of autonomy, such as those made popular by the likes 
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of Frankfurt and (Gerald) Dworkin.20 According to these views, an autonomous 
decision is one that is consistent with the higher order preferences of an agent. Those 
who lack real autonomous choice are those who decide on the basis of compulsive 
first-order desires; those who have real choice are those who act on the basis of 
reflective second (or higher) order desires. It seems obvious that the decisions of the 
conscientious objector would match this definition of autonomous choice since, as 
defined previously, the conscience is the source of higher reasons that dictates the 
choice in a particular context. 
There are two problems with this response. The first is that this higher-order 
view is itself deeply unsatisfactory. As others have pointed out,21 if this theory is 
correct, then someone who is brainwashed into accepting a certain set of values (e.g. 
by a religious cult leader) can be said to be acting autonomously because they will be 
fully committed to those values (they will ‘want to want’ them – to adopt the 
language of Frankfurtian autonomy). But this seems to be wrong. A person who is 
manipulated into accepting a certain set of values is perhaps the epitome of the lack of 
autonomy because their acceptance of those values is not properly independent.22  
The other reason for rejecting this response is that it may simply not be true 
that the typical conscientious objector acts on the basis of reflective higher-order 
																																								 																				
20 Frankfurt, H ‘Freedom of the will and the concept of a person’ (1971) 68 Journal of Philosophy 5-
20; Dworkin, G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: CUP 1988) 
21 Richard Double The Non-Reality of Free Will; Derk Pereboom Free Will, Agency and Meaning in 
Life (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 
22 Frankfurt appears willing to bite the bullet on this score. Dworkin tries to address it by appealing to 
hierarchically endorsed values with the right kind of causal history (i.e. that are not manipulated or 
coerced). But it is very difficult to determine what the right causal history is. Dworkin proposes a test 
whereby the individual is asked (after the fact) whether they would endorse the means whereby they 
acquired the values. But this too is unsatisfactory as those who are brainwashed into a set of beliefs will 
often be inclined to endorse the means of acquisition after the fact. In any event, we say more about the 
typical pathways through which a conscience is developed below. 
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preferences. This argument is developed more fully in relation to the lack of choice at 
T0, below. To briefly anticipate some of its elements, the empirical evidence on moral 
conscience and moral decision-making suggests that many people have no reflective 
basis for their deepest moral commitments. On the contrary, they are often 
‘dumbfounded’ when challenged to come up with principles that explain their 
commitments. Thus, they act in a manner that often lacks some conscious process of 
identifying and committing to a reflective higher-order preference. 
This defence of the lack of choice at T1 might seem inconsequential. While 
we believe that it has some analytical and normative significance, we concede that 
others may tend to view the decision to act in accordance with one’s conscience at T1 
as a perfect exemplar of autonomous choice on the grounds that the requisite 
autonomy can be traced back to the period of time over which the contents of one’s 
conscience was developed. This necessitates an argument in relation to the lack of 
choice at T0. 
	 2.2	 –	 The	 Lack	 of	 Real	 Choice	 over	 the	 Content	 of	 One’s	
Conscience	
  
It will be useful to start with a clearer sense of the problem. Dennett has used 
the example of Martin Luther to illustrate that meaningful choice at a particular 
moment in time is not needed in order to exercise meaningful control over one’s 
decisions.23 When he was brought before the Diet of Worms to explain his 
inauguration of the Protestant Reformation, Luther explicitly invoked the demands of 
																																								 																				




conscience, allegedly commenting ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’. That is to say, he 
explicitly acknowledged the lack of choice with respect to his actions, and explained 
them by reference to what was necessitated by his conscience. It is a classic exemplar 
of what we have argued in relation to T1 – and presumably a representative 
description of the ‘internal point of view’ of most conscientious objectors.    
But this does not and should not lead us to conclude that Luther acted without 
genuine control over his actions. Luther’s conscience may have made it impossible 
for him to do otherwise, but this just implies that the ability to choose among options 
is irrelevant to the question of autonomous control over an action. Others such as 
Kane24 agree that Luther may have acted with autonomous control, but they argue that 
this is because the exercise of autonomy can be traced back25 to an earlier moment in 
time, namely: the moment (or moments) at which he developed his conscience. As 
Kane puts it: 
‘If [Luther’s] act did issue from his existing character, then his moral 
accountability for it would depend on whether he was responsible by 
virtue of earlier choices and actions for being the sort of person he had 
become at that time…Often we act from a will that is already formed, but 
it is “our own free will” by virtue of the fact that we formed it by other 
choices and actions in our past…’ 26  
 
																																								 																				
24 Kane, R. The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 
25 Tracing conditions of this sort are actively defended by participants in the free will/moral 
responsibility debate e.g. Fischer and Tonganazzini ‘The Truth about Tracing’ (2009) 43 Nous 531-556 
26 Quote from Kane, R. Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p 82 
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All of this suggests a general escape route for the defender of the autonomy-based 
view of conscientious objection. If they can prove that the typical conscientious 
objector had some meaningful choice with respect to the formation of their conscience 
(i.e. if they had choice at T0), then this will transfer over to the decision made at T1 
and imply that they acted autonomously at T1, even if they lacked choice or control at 
that particular moment. Thus, it may still be the case that we tolerate their 
conscientious objection out of respect for their autonomy.  
But we argue that this escape route is unlikely to be available. It is highly 
implausible to suppose that the development of conscience is something that flows 
from or can be traced to autonomous choices. Our conscience is something we 
stumble upon; that is thrust upon us by forces beyond our control. There are two ways 
in which we can defend this: by appealing to evidence suggesting that our general 
character and commitments are shaped by forces beyond our control; and by 
appealing to evidence that applies specifically in relation to the formation of moral 
commitments and beliefs. The former effectively amounts to an embrace of hard 
determinism (i.e. the view that there is no such thing as autonomous choice); the latter 
is more moderate and is consistent with both compatibilist and indeterminist views of 
free will (i.e. it holds that autonomous choice is possible, maybe even for 
conscientious objectors but very rare or unlikely, no matter what understanding of 
autonomous choice you apply). 
Although our argument does not ultimately depend upon it, we think there is 
much to be said for the hard determinist stance on autonomous choice. In recent years 
there has been a growing understanding that people do not really have freedom to 
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choose – at least not in the broad, thick meaning of the term – at any moment in their 
lives. It has been indicated by psychologists,27 experimental philosophers28, 
neuroscientists29 and sociobiologists30 that our preferences, tastes, character,31 moral 
values32 and ultimately acts are dictated by our genes, brain activity, childhood 
experiences or traumas, socialisation, environment, and unconscious cognitive and 
emotional factors – all of which are beyond our control. For example, with respect to 
character and action, we have no control or very little or limited control over our 
willingness to take risks;33 over whether we are sensitive to other people’s emotions 
or able to understand them; or over being constantly fearless or cowardly; or over 
being lazy or hardworking, shy or assertive, thoughtful or rude, or even liberal in 
political outlook.34 Of course, we often have a strong feeling of being in control, but 
																																								 																				
27 Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (John Baer, James Kaufman and Roy Baumeister eds; 
OUP; 2008) especially chapters 8, 10, 11, 12; Deaniel Wegner The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). 
28 Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nicholes ‘Free Will and the Bounds of the Self’ in The Oxford Handbook 
of Free Will (Robert Kane ed; 2nd ed; OUP; 2011) 530-554.  
29 Benjamin Libet ‘Do we have Free will?’ 6 Journal of Consciousness Studies 47-47 (1999); Benjamin 
Libet ‘Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain’ 8 Journal of Consciousness Studies 59-65 (2001); 
Henrik Walter ‘Contribution of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate: From Random Movement to 
Intelligible Action’ in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Robert Kane ed; 2nd ed; OUP; 2011) 515-
529. 
30 Edward Wilson Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Harvard University Press, 1975). 
31 See in particular, Doris, J. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: CUP, 
2003), which uses psychological evidence to argue against the concept of a robust moral character. 
32 J Greene, Moral Tribes; J Haidt, The Righteous Mind (London: Penguin 2012) 
33 Muchael Zyphuri, Jayanth Narayanan, Richard Arvey, and Gordon Alexander ‘The Genetics of 
Economic Risk Preferences’ 22  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 367-377 (2009); Anna Dreber 
‘Biological Basis of Risk Preferences’ Gruter Institute Squaw Valley Conference – Innovation and 
Economic Growth (18 May 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611259.  
34 For recent research that shows that liberals may owe their political outlook partly to their genetic 
make-up, see Jaime Settle, Christopher Dawes, Nicholas Christakis, and James Fowler ‘Friendships 
Moderate an Association between a Dopamine Gene Variant and Political Ideology’ 72(4) The Journal 
of Politics 1189-1198 (2010). 
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more and more evidence suggests that this is illusory.35 Experimental research shows 
that ‘even behaviour that subjects believe to be completely under conscious control is 
influenced by external factors’.36 This view is, of course, not just limited to the 
sciences. The number of philosophers taking on board this growing body of evidence, 
and defending an anti-free will and anti-autonomous choice position is increasing, 
with several authors in recent years making a strong case for this hard determinist 
view.37 There are still plenty of people willing to defend the alternative view (some of 
whom will be discussed below). Still, in light of this growing body of evidence, and 
the absence of persuasive account of how free will in fact works, we would suggest a 
reversal of the burden of proof might be appropriate on this issue: it is up to those 
who believe that one’s conscience is developed through the exercise of autonomous 
choice to prove that this is, in fact, true and to show how it takes place.  
It may be argued that appealing to this general free will scepticism is odd in 
the present context. After all, we started with a specific (Razian) conception of 
autonomy and its value and used that to scrutinise the nature of conscientious 
objection and the toleration thereof. This intimated that we had a narrow focus in this 
article on the topic of conscientious objection. But the general argument just outlined 
																																								 																				
35 The work of Patrick Haggard is particularly strong on this point: Filevich E, Kühn S, Haggard P. 
‘There is no free won't: antecedent brain activity predicts decisions to inhibit’ (2013) 8 PLoS One 
e53053; Haggard, P ‘Decision time for free will’ (2011) 69(3) Neuron 404-406; Haggard P, Clark S & 
Kalogeras J. ‘Voluntary action and Conscious Awareness (2002) 5 Nature Neuroscience 80-84. 
36 Henry Roediger, Michael Goode and Franklin Zaromb ‘Free Will and the Control of Action’ in Are 
We Free? Psychology and Free Will (John Baer, James Kaufman and Roy Baumeister eds; OUP; 2008) 
205-225.  
37 Levy, N. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2011); 
Waller, B. Against Moral Responsibility (MIT Press, 2011); Caruso, G. Free Will and Consciousness: 
A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will (Lexington Books, 2013); Caruso, G. (ed) Exploring 
the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Lexington Books, 2013); Pereboom, D. Free Will, 
Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford: OUP, 2014)   
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has much broader significance. It implies that most people, most of the time, lack 
anything approaching autonomy, be it Razian or otherwise. Thus, it suggests that 
autonomy cannot really be a central concept in political theory. Surely we do not wish 
to push the argument that far?  
The answer is that we are not worried about these broader implications. We 
remain focused on the question of the analytical and normative basis on which 
conscientious objectors are tolerated. If what we have just argued has broader 
implications, so be it: we believe that exploring the implications of the anti-free will 
view in particular narrow domains is, in itself, of value. Many who defend the anti-
free will view talk about the societal implications in a general fashion, or focus 
largely on crime and punishment. By honing in on an alternative area of legal and 
political philosophy we can assist in adding more flesh to this general view. 
Furthermore, we submit that there is nothing paradoxical or self-defeating about 
trying to reconceptualise the normative basis on which conscientious objectors are 
tolerated if one embraces such free will scepticism. Some people might argue that it is 
strange to offer moral or normative arguments against or in favour of a particular 
practice if we have no real choice over what to do anyway. But this is to assume that 
free will scepticism is tantamount to nihilistic fatalism. It is not. Moral reasons and 
moral arguments can still be relevant (and causally efficacious) in a world without 
free will as traditionally conceived. 
Fortunately, one does not need to embrace this strong form of free will 
scepticism to embrace our argument. There is a narrower argument to be made about 
the development of moral conscience itself (excluding other aspects of one’s character 
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and action) and the unlikelihood of developing one’s conscience in an autonomous 
fashion. This narrower argument holds out the possibility that some few individuals 
might develop conscience through an autonomous process but suggests that such 
instances will be extremely rare and, hence, provide at best a counterintuitive basis on 
which to tolerate conscientious objections.  
This narrower argument starts by appealing to the emerging consensus in 
moral psychology, which suggests that moral conscience is the causal product of a 
basic, genetically endowed cognitive architecture that is then moulded by the cultural 
and social environment of the individual agent, not through rational reflection by the 
agent themselves. The work of Jonathan Haidt is particularly instructive on this 
point.38 He argues that human beings share a set of six moral foundations, which get 
tuned up and down through the course of one’s cognitive development. These 
foundations consist in the sensitivity to distinct categories of moral good/bad, e.g. 
care/harm, fairness/cheating, sanctity/degradation. The degree of sensitivity and 
significance attached to these different categories varies depending on the cultural and 
social background of the individual. Indeed, Haidt finds that the variation in moral 
response profiles is quite tightly correlated to the cultural and social background of 
the individual. Thus, for example, those from upper-class backgrounds tend to view 
violations of religious dress codes as pure matters of social convention, whereas those 
																																								 																				
38 For a general overview, see Flanagan, O. The Geography of Morals (Oxford: OUP, 2017); Haidt, J. 
The Righteous Mind (London: Penguin 2012). For more scientific discussions, see Haidt, J. ‘The 
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’ (2001) 108 
Psychological Review 814-834; Haidt, J. ‘The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology’ (2007) 316 
Science 998-1002; and Haidt, J. and Joseph, C ‘Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions 
Generate Culturally Variable Virtues’ (2004) Daedalus fall, 55-66. 
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from lower class backgrounds view them as significant moral violations.39 Many more 
examples along these lines provide evidence for the claim that moral conscience is 
something that is thrust upon the individual, by the society and culture in which they 
live, not something they dictate through autonomous choice.  
This is supported by Haidt and other moral psychologists’ findings that most 
moral decision-making is not based on any rational reflective consideration of moral 
reasons for action. In reality, people do not always have a clear, consciously 
articulable sense of their moral values. They simply react to scenarios (usually in 
predictable and reliable ways) and then confabulate moral reasons for action after the 
fact.40 This is deeply troubling for any account of autonomous choice that supposes 
that we can grasp and act upon moral reasons for action, or that we act in a manner 
that expresses our higher order preferences. Indeed, the evidence seems to suggest 
that moral actors frequently have no clear sense of what their higher order preferences 
might be. They react intuitively and without conscious reason. This reinforces the 
notion that autonomous choice does not dictate the development of moral conscience 
at T0. To be clear, in defending this narrower claim about moral conscience we are 
not claiming conscience is fixed and unalterable. On the contrary, we accept that it 
can and often is changed over the course of an individual’s life. We are simply 
denying that these changes are governed by anything that can be called autonomous 
choice. 
We believe that these two arguments provide ample support for the lack of 
																																								 																				
39 Haidt, J.; Koller, S. and Dias, M. ‘Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is it Wrong to Eat Your Dog?’ 
(1993) 65 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 33:1-36 
40 Haidt cites several lines of evidence for this view. See The Righteous Mind, chapter 2. 
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real choice at T0. Nevertheless, there is an obvious counterargument. As noted above, 
some might accept that the picture we have painted is true for the majority of people, 
but insist that in at least some cases the development of conscience is governed by 
autonomous choice and these are the cases that matter from the perspective of 
toleration. Thus, there remains the possibility of the autonomous convert, who adopts 
a stance of conscientious objection through careful deliberation, reflection and choice 
and whose choices ought to be tolerated on that basis.  
There are two things to be said in response to this suggestion. First, we can 
quite happily concede the possibility (conceptual or empirical) of the autonomous 
convert. This does not greatly affect our position. Our argument relates to the typical 
conscientious objector and the general societal basis on which their objection is to be 
tolerated. The fact that there may be occasional objectors who arrive at their position 
through a genuine exercise of autonomy does not greatly disturb this picture. But in 
saying this we would caution people against readily assuming that particular instances 
of conversion to a cause involve autonomous choice. Once again, we would submit 
that the empirical evidence suggests that most converts are influenced by factors 
beyond their control and merely adopt readily available sets of moral principles to 
rationalise their conversion. The autonomous selection of these moral principles is not 
the best predictor of what they do.41 Again, in light of this general picture, we suggest 
that the burden of proof is on those claiming that there are genuine cases of 
autonomous conversion, not on the defenders of the lack of choice position. 
																																								 																				
41 A good illustration of this is Atran’s work on conversions to a terrorist cause, which are often not 
best explained by commitment to an ideology but rather by the presence of a certain kind of social 
network or fictive kinship: Atran, S. Talking to the Enemy (New York: Ecco Books, 2010) 
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The second response to the possibility of autonomous conversion is to take 
issue with the primary philosophical accounts of this process. We think in particular 
here of the accounts of self-forming actions proffered by Robert Kane and Mark 
Balaguer (both of whom are libertarians and indeterminists when it comes to the 
possibility of free will and choice); and the intentional self-modification account 
proffered by Alfred Mele (which is essentially compatibilist in nature). These 
accounts put forward potential mechanisms for autonomous conversion, but we 
believe that neither is likely to succeed in showing that such conversion is plausible or 
sufficient to defeat our argument. 
The Kane/Balaguer account focuses on particular moments in time when 
agents face tough decisions, with equally weighty reasons for two or more options, 
and are consequently forced to choose between the options through the pure exercise 
of undetermined will. Balaguer42 (whose version of this is the most up to date) calls 
such decisions torn decisions and believes that they play an important part in how we 
exercise autonomous control over our lives. To apply the concept to the present 
discussion, we could imagine someone trying to decide whether to commit to the 
principle of radical nonviolence and become a conscientious objector to the military 
draft, or whether to accept some need for violent self-defence and do their duty. They 
will have identified the arguments favouring pacifism and the arguments against; they 
will perceive the sets of arguments on both sides as being of equal weight; and they 
will ‘just choose’ to come down in favour of radical nonviolence. Balaguer’s view is 
that because the causal environment was in a state of equilibrium at the moment prior 
																																								 																				
42 Balaguer, M Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010) 
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to the choice (the sets of reasons were perfectly balanced), the decision was 
undetermined and hence a genuinely free choice. The individual is, consequently, an 
autonomous convert to the pacifist cause.  
There are at least two problems with this potential mechanism of conversion. 
In the first instance, it is not at all clear that it is empirically plausible or tractable. 
Studies already suggest that we are not the best interpreters of the causes underlying 
our behaviour: we may believe that the reasons are equally weighted and that nothing 
external to ourselves is forcing our decision, but we may be wrong. Second, it is not 
clear that it is even conceptually compelling. As others have pointed out,43 it relies on 
an exceptionally thin account of what it means for an individual to exercise choice at 
a particular moment, and then compounds the importance of this thin account by 
tracing the responsibility for future actions back to the moment of these torn 
decisions. On the Kane/Balaguer account, there is nothing about the agent prior to the 
moment of the torn decision – i.e. nothing about their beliefs, character, education and 
so forth – that settles the decision that is ultimately made. Consequently, it seems like 
they are not really in control; their decision is indistinguishable from an event 
involving pure chance or luck. It is difficult to see any solace here for the defender of 
the autonomous convert. 
This brings us to Alfred Mele’s account of intentional self-modification.44 It is 
illustrated by a thought experiment. Mele asks us to imagine Betty, a six-year-old girl 
																																								 																				
43 Pereboom, D. Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp 33-39; Dennett, D 
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who is afraid of the basement in her house. Betty knows that no harm has come to 
anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. 
Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is ‘babyish’ and takes steps to overcome it. 
She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time 
until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she 
loses her irrational fear. She has intentionally modified her character, over an 
extended period of time, and so when she later makes decisions on the basis of that 
modified character they can be rightly viewed as autonomous because of the method 
of conversion. This model of intentional self-modification could arise in the case of a 
convert to a particular set of moral values and principles. Again, imagine the putative-
pacifist, who has some resistance to the principle of radical nonviolence at first, but 
forces themselves to analyse more of the arguments and debates, to attend meetings 
and public talks, and then gradually, over a period of months and years, grows to 
embrace the cause. Are they not then an autonomous convert? 
There are several potential responses to this claim. First, it is doubtful whether 
Mele’s model of self-modification is a good fit for the kinds of conversion that are 
relevant to conscientious objection cases. Betty, as imagined by Mele, is using an 
evaluative principle (‘I should not be so babyish’ or ‘babyishness is a negative 
quality’) to determine a course of action that allows her to modify her personal 
characteristics. The evaluative principle is the fixed point that drives the intentional 
self-modification. But in the case of the autonomous convert, it is usually the 
evaluative principles that are themselves being modified. Now, of course, there could 
be hierarchies of values, and values that are higher up the hierarchy might be used to 
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drive some intentional modification, but it is certainly more difficult to imagine cases 
in which this will take place given the eventual ‘trump card’ status of conscientious 
commitments.  
Second, Mele’s model presupposes that the agent has the cognitive capacities 
that will facilitate the self-modification. As Waller points out,45 someone like Betty is 
what psychologists would call a chronic cogniser, i.e. someone who takes pleasure in 
thinking and extended deliberation. She is not a chronic miser, i.e. someone who 
dislikes extended deliberation and prefers to act impulsively. Such an individual 
would not be able to intentionally self-modify (or, at the very least, would find it 
exceptionally difficult to do so). If one can only be an autonomous convert if one is a 
chronic cogniser and uses this capacity to engage in a process of intentional self-
modification, then three problems would seem to emerge. First, there is the difficultly 
of knowing whether this is in fact how someone arrived at their beliefs after the fact, 
particularly given that individuals are not the best or most accurate self-historians. 
Second, there is the apparent fact – from the findings in moral psychology given 
above – that most people do not arrive at their moral beliefs through this process of 
intentional self-modification. And third, there is the fact that if one embraces the 
notion that one can only tolerate a conscientious objection that has been arrived at 
following a process of intentional self-modification, one is doing something that 
seems normatively undesirable. You are unfairly favouring one type of conscientious 
objection due to the results of a natural/social lottery (i.e. the distribution of cognitive 
capacities and talents). If the results of this lottery are not under our control why 
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should we be more tolerant of the chronic cogniser than the chronic miser?  
To sum up, we think it highly unlikely that a conscientious objector exercises 
autonomous control over the development of their conscience at T0. We concede the 
possibility of a truly autonomous convert, but we think this is unlikely to be the norm 
and that focusing our understanding of conscientious objection on them leads to a 
counterintuitively narrow conception of what a conscientious objection is. We suggest 
that the burden of proof is on those who claim otherwise.  
When this argument is coupled with the argument for the lack of choice at T1, 
we believe there is strong case for believing that the typical conscientious objector is 
not acting out of some exercise of autonomous choice or freedom of conscience. 
Rather, they are acting as they must, as the conscience that they did not shape 
demands. We turn next to the analytical and normative implications of this view. 
 
3.	 The	 analytical	 and	 normative	 implications	 of	 the	 lack	 of	
choice	argument	
The implications of the lack of choice argument are twofold: first, if conscientious 
objections are tolerated – they are tolerated inter alia because of the lack of choice. 
Second, the lack of choice always provides a reason for tolerating conscientious 
objections but not necessarily a strong or conclusive reason. 
The first implication of the lack of choice argument is analytical by its nature. 
If the lack of choice argument is sound, then tolerating conscientious objection does 
not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather 
acknowledges his lack of real ability to choose his conscience and to refrain from 
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acting upon his conscience. The lack of choice argument provides an accurate 
explanation for the nature and importance of freedom of conscience. It provides an 
accurate description of what we do when we tolerate conscientious objection.  
From the conscientious objectors’ point of view, when they follow their 
conscience’s dictates they do not feel that they are exercising ongoing free and 
autonomous choice in that matter. They are in fact compelled to obey their 
conscience’s dictates and express their attitude by using words such as ‘dictates of 
conscience’ or ‘commands of conscience’ rather than ‘choices of conscience’ or 
‘advices of conscience’.  
This is the most compelling way to understand the fascinating duality of the 
nature of conscience: it is both an inner-part of our deepest and personal moral values 
(thus part of our moral personality) and an external source of moral commands – in 
the sense that its content and scope were decided by forces beyond our control. This 
duality is nicely expressed in Constance Braithwaite’s description of her own 
experience as conscientious objector: ‘I felt both that I was acting completely freely 
and that I could not possibly act otherwise; that I was expressing my essential self and 
that I was bearing an impersonal witness’.46  
Thus, from an analytical-descriptive point of view, freedom of conscience 
does not protect the right to choose to do X (or not to do X), as much as it protects the 
right to do X (or not to do X) without being exposed to sanctions. This perception of 
what freedom of conscience means demonstrates why the ‘will theory’ or the ‘choice 
theory’ of rights cannot properly describe the nature of all rights (or their main 
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function). The ‘will theory’ may have its appeal, in the sense that, when one has a 
right (or liberty), one normally has a choice whether or not to exercise it. Put 
differently, the function of some rights is to give their holder control over another's 
duty. When the right-holder chooses to exercise his right he imposes duties on others. 
The assumption here is that the right-holder can always choose not to exercise his 
right and by that to waive the other’s correlative duties. However, when one is 
compelled by one’s conscience to do X or to avoid doing X, one is simply seeking a 
legal right to act upon one’s conscience, which may mean having a legal right to do 
what one would do anyway, because one does not have a real choice in this matter. 
Having a legal (or moral) right in these cases does not have to entail a choice whether 
to exercise it. Thus, the will theory of rights may describe accurately the function of 
some rights. It fails however to describe the meaning and function of freedom of 
conscience.  
Brian Leiter asks why protecting liberty of conscience promotes human well-
being. His answer is that ‘many of the arguments trade, at bottom, on a simple idea: 
namely, that being able to choose what to believe and how to live… makes for a better 
life. Being told what you must believe and how you must live, conversely, make lives 
worse’.47 We suggest, however, that being able to choose what to believe and how to 
live is not the only alternative to being told what to believe and how to behave. A 
third option exists, according to which protecting a person’s right to have and act 
upon a certain conscience promotes the person’s well-being precisely because one 
cannot really choose one’s conscience, i.e. select what to believe in and, at times, how 
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to live. Leiter himself acknowledges the lack of choice argument when he writes that 
‘a claim of conscience is, after all, a claim about what one must do, no matter what’.48   
It is therefore misguided to talk about ‘protecting liberty of conscience’ since we have 
no liberty with regard to choosing our conscience. The liberty that we do claim is the 
liberty to have a conscience and to act upon it without being subjected to sanctions. 
Not respecting this kind of liberty will indeed make our lives worse but not because 
we were denied the ability to choose but because forcing us to act against our non-
chosen conscience will result in great harm to our moral integrity.  
Things are more complex with regard to the normative implications of the lack 
of choice argument. The common way to justify tolerating conscientious objection is 
to turn to the principle of autonomy. We suggest that a better way to justify tolerating 
conscientious objection is to acknowledge that in matters of conscience, people do not 
have real choice. Here we do not only claim that acknowledging the lack of choice 
explains what we do when we tolerate conscientious objection. We now claim that the 
lack of choice provides a reason for tolerating conscientious objection. This argument 




We should be careful not to push the lack of choice argument too far. Garvey, for 
example, offers a provocative view according to which what separates religion from 
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non-religion is that the former ‘is a lot like insanity’.49 Therefore, the religious 
believer is truly compelled by his belief to do something or to avoid doing something 
because he lacks the will – in the same way as an insane person lacks the will – to 
choose to do otherwise, at least not without completely diminishing his personhood. 
In Garvey’s words, we should protect religious believers’ freedom precisely because 
they are not free.50 Garvey’s observation pushes the lack of choice argument a bit too 
far by equating lack of choice with insanity. Both sane and insane people can lack real 
choice when they act in a certain way – but for different reasons and in different 
ways. Insane people cannot reason their decisions and may even lack the ability to 
fully understand the nature of their decisions and their implications. Sane 
conscientious objectors are compelled by their conscience, but they may be able to 
reason their decisions (even if wrongly), i.e. to understand them and to comprehend 
their implications. Lack of choice may exist in various cases but its nature and extent 
may vary. Conscientious objectors, insane persons, those who are threatened by a 
robber, those who have only one valuable option and many horrible ones – all lack 
real choice but it would be a mistake to treat all these cases or persons equally.    
Garvey’s lack of choice argument is also too narrow as he only applies it to 
religious conventions. As we shall see below, this is a common mistake. Most of the 
(few) scholars who do claim that conscientious objectors lack real choice (normally 
without justifying this assertion) limit their argument to religious conscientious 
objection or to religious convictions. It is true that the religious believer does not 
																																								 																				
49 JH Garvey, 'Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty' (1986) 18 Connecticut Law Review 
779, 793, 798. 
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choose his belief and does not have the free will to act against it (and this does not 
make him ‘insane’), but the same thing can be said about most non-religious 
conscientious objectors as well.  
3.2	Conscientious	convictions	–	and	preferences	
 
Understanding the justification for tolerating conscientious objection as one that refers 
to lack of choice is important when we are trying to answer the question of why 
conscientious convictions are different from mere preferences. Three criteria can be 
taken into account in order to differentiate between claims of conscience and claims 
of preference: vulnerability (in the sense of being adversely affected by neutral laws); 
ability to choose; and moral personhood. Views according to which no conscientious 
exemptions should ever be granted from legal rules eliminate the distinction between 
conscientious convictions and mere preferences as all are equally not being 
tolerated.51 The distinction does exist, however. The only question is which of the 
three reasons grounds this distinction: vulnerability, ability to choose or the 
importance of moral personhood. 
The distinction between preferences and conscience does not result from 
differences in terms of vulnerability, as ‘general’ or ‘neutral’ laws may adversely 
affect preferences and conscientious convictions alike. More accurately, vulnerability 
cannot be the sole justification for tolerating conscientious objection rather than 
preference-based objection. Vulnerability matters most when the vulnerable person 
cannot simply choose to change his behaviour in order to comply with the neutral 
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legal demand. Eisgruber and Sager implicitly apply this argument while comparing 
holding a religious belief to having a physical disability.52 Both may prevent or make 
it harder for a person to obey neutral laws, i.e. laws that do not intend to harm or 
impose an exceptional burden on either religious adherents or disabled people (and 
here, also, the argument should apply to non-religious conscientious objectors). 
Eisgruber and Sager argue that an exemption from the law may be required in both 
cases and for the same reason – the vulnerability of religious believers and disabled 
people with regard to neutral laws. It is implied here that religious believers cannot 
simply will to change their belief or to choose to act against it almost to the extent of 
disabled people being limited by their physical disability. Equating conscientious 
convictions with disability or placing requests based on conscientious convictions on 
equal footing with requests on grounds of health may seem farfetched. The common 
counter-argument (which is normally made within the context of the religious 
conscience) is that people living with a disability or an illness did not choose their 
condition, whereas religious believers have made the choice to embrace a given 
religion and to interpret it strictly. It is argued that religious believers can always 
choose to interpret and practice their religion differently or even to give it up.53 
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi answers this argument well by submitting that ‘religious 
identity has nothing to do with choice or deliberation and everything to do with the 
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53 J Maclure and C Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
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accidents of birth and history’.54 This observation is true with regard to non-religious 
beliefs, as well as to the religious and non-religious conscience.  
Thus, the distinction between conscience and preferences cannot be justified 
only on the ground of vulnerability. It also does not result solely from a difference in 
the ability to choose as we do not choose either our conscience or our preferences. We 
simply have them. The distinction between conscience and preferences results from 
the fact that severe harm to one’s moral personhood is only inflicted when one 
decides or is being compelled to act contrary to one’s conscience (rather than to one’s 
preferences) in order to avoid a meaningful sanction.  
Yet, the fact that severe harm to one’s moral personhood is inflicted when one 
acts against one’s conscience is only important if we assume that one does not choose 
one’s conscience and cannot simply will to change it. Maclure and Taylor, for 
example, argue that imposing a ‘restriction of conscience’ rather than a ‘restriction of 
preference’ inflicts ‘moral harm’ and violates one’s moral integrity and self-respect.55 
This is no doubt true. But, if conscience and religious faith can be chosen, as Maclure 
and Taylor argue,56 then believers have the ability to adapt their beliefs and life plan 
to the conditions with which they must come to terms. They can simply choose to 
modify their conscience – and if they choose otherwise they should be responsible for 
their choice. Thus, convictions of conscience may be a ‘particular type of subjective 
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preference’ as noted by Maclure and Taylor,57 but not just because of the ‘harm to the 
moral personhood’ criterion. Conscientious convictions are special because of the 
special harm that is caused to a person who acts against his non-chosen moral 
convictions, which cannot be changed at will.    
While Maclure and Taylor wrongly argue that conscientious convictions are 
chosen, Bedi wrongly argues that only conscientious convictions are not chosen 
whereas mere preferences are in fact chosen – and that that fact differentiates between 
the two. Bedi argues that in order to prefer religious beliefs to mere preferences, ‘we 
must see the religious practice as effectively unchosen, rigid and inhospitable to 
contestation … the more the religious group is seen as just like any other voluntary 
association or preference, the more difficult it becomes to justify an exemption’.58 
This view has more general implications. Bedi explains that ‘on the one hand, 
contemporary theory has come to see religious affiliations and practices as contingent, 
open-ended and freely constructed. On the other hand, in order to justify different or 
special treatment for such groups we must view these affiliations as unchosen, static 
and not freely constructed’.59 Bedi demonstrates that ‘free choice’ could not be the 
right justification for granting religious exemptions and not merely preference-based 
exemptions. Bedi’s argument is mostly descriptive. He does say that he strongly 
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doubts that religion occupies one extreme or the other (i.e., religion as complete 
choice and religion as complete lack of choice), but his main argument is simply that, 
in order to create a distinction between religion and mere preferences with respect to 
the issue of legal exemptions, religion should be perceived as largely non-chosen, 
static and not freely constructed.  
Bedi’s general argument is appealing but suffers from three drawbacks. First, 
Bedi is right to suggest that the religious conscience is not chosen and that that 
provides a reason to tolerate it. Bedi’s lack of choice argument, however, is in fact an 
assertion as it is not based on in-depth philosophical arguments about the meaning 
and nature of having lack of choice, or on related empirical, sociological and 
behavioural findings. In this paper we tried to offer sound basis for Bedi’s and others’ 
intuitive (yet still helpful) assertion. Second, Bedi (much like Garvey,60 Beit-
Hallahmi,61 Eisgruber and Sager,62 and Roberts and Lester63) addresses the lack of 
choice argument within the context of religion – and religious conscientious 
exemptions. He ignores the non-religious conscience and does not apply his 
arguments to cases of non-religious conscientious exemptions. This omission may 
lead to a misguided conclusion according to which the lack of choice argument 
justifies granting favourable treatment to religious-conscientious objectors rather than 
perceiving the lack of choice argument as a reason to tolerate all types of 
conscientious objections. Third, Bedi is wrong to suggest that the lack of choice 
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argument only applies to (religious) moral convictions – and not to mere preferences.  
The fact is that our preferences are also unchosen. They are dictated by our genes, 
brain activity, childhood experiences or traumas, socialization, environment, and 
unconscious cognitive and emotional factors – all of which are beyond our control. 
We do not choose our preferences. We simply have them and cannot change them at 
will. Therefore, the ‘lack of choice’ argument, when it stands alone, cannot explain 
the difference between conscientious convictions and mere preferences. It does, 
however, provide a reason to tolerate conscientious objection – when put together 
with the ‘moral personality’ reason.    
3.3	Lack	of	choice,	moral	responsibility	and	legal	responsibility	
 
Within the specific context of conscientious objection, whether religious or not, the 
importance of the ‘lack of choice’ argument should not be overstated. Roberts and 
Lester, for example, claim that ‘one reason to choose greater tolerance instead of 
lesser sensitivity in the case of religion is that many religious believers feel their 
beliefs are immutable or non-negotiable… people should not be blamed for matters 
outside of their control’.64 The first part of the argument is true though its scope 
should be expanded so it will apply to all types of conscience whether religious or not. 
The fact that conscientious convictions are not chosen provides one reason for 
tolerating conscientious objection. The second part of the argument (‘people should 
not be blamed for matters outside of their control’) should be treated with caution. 
Even if the argument that conscience is indeed not chosen is established it does not 
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follow that conscientious objection should be legally tolerated in all cases or indeed 
any. More reasons are required here. Accordingly, there may be good reasons for not 
tolerating conscientious objectors – even if conscientious convictions are not chosen.  
People may not be morally responsible for ‘matters outside of their control’ – but they 
may be legally responsible for them. The lack of choice argument always provides a 
reason for legally tolerating conscientious objections because people cannot be held 
morally responsible for decisions they made – but did not choose to make. In cases of 
conscientious objection, our conscience, which we did not choose but simply have, 
compels us to disobey the law. In contrast to physical compulsion in which we do not 
will the compulsory act, under conscience-based compulsion we do will the 
compulsory act even though we cannot choose to do otherwise. The lack of choice to 
do otherwise or the compulsion to disobey the law might deny our moral 
responsibility even if we actively will to disobey the law and do not try to resist the 
compulsion to disobey the law. Legal responsibility – while different from moral 
responsibility – cannot ignore the lack of moral responsibility. But there are cases in 
which the ‘lack of choice argument’ applies in full yet the conscientious objector 
should not be tolerated at all or to a certain extent either because of policy 
considerations, the content of his conscience or because of neutral justifications.   
Two examples can clarify this point. The law can impose a duty to vaccinate 
one’s child in order to protect that child’s health as well as the health of others. The 
law may also exempt from the rule any sincere conscientious objector. It will 
probably be justified to grant exemptions to the law only as long as the anticipated 
number of objectors does not jeopardize the rationale of the rule itself (protecting the 
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public health). When the legitimate purpose of the rule is jeopardized, some (or all) 
conscientious objectors to vaccination would not be granted exemptions regardless of 
the lack of choice argument – and in order to protect rights and interests of others (or 
public interests). Conscientious exemptions should also not be granted to those who 
object the law because they hold morally repugnant consciences, e.g. those who 
disobey equality laws because their conscience compels them to discriminate on 
grounds of race. The racist conscientious objector may not be able to act otherwise – 
and this may be a reason for tolerating his objection – yet this reason will almost 
always be outweighed by stronger reasons not to tolerate it.   
3.4	Lack	of	choice	–	as	a	reason	for	tolerance	
 
The argument made above was that the lack of choice argument always provides a 
reason for tolerating conscientious objection. The weight that should be accorded to 
this reason may vary and it may be overridden by other reasons – but it should always 
be taken into consideration.     
The lack of choice argument, which leads to lack of moral responsibility – and 
in turn provides a reason to legally tolerate conscientious objection, may be troubling 
to some. Kimberley Brownlee, for example, rejects the normative implications of the 
lack of choice argument – and for two reasons. First, she argues that denial of 
responsibility for what we call a ‘conscience-based act’ ‘is in tension with the 
Aristotelian conception of us as persons who wish to show that we have reasons for 
acting as we do’.65 However, our lack of choice regarding having a conscience and 
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acting upon it does not rule out our ability to reason our decision. The reasons will 
follow the act of conscience that we are compelled to do – rather than precede it – but 
we can still provide such reasons and they may or may not be persuading. Moreover, 
it may be true that persons normally wish to show that they have reasons for acting as 
they do, but as we noted above it does not follow that they actually have such reasons, 
that these reasons are genuine or that they preceded the act.    
Brownlee adds that using the compulsion or lack of choice argument for 
tolerating conscientious objection ‘would most likely protect the capricious passions 
and proclivities of the least reasonable rather than the sincere, serious reflective moral 
commitments of the more reasonable’.66 We do not think that this is the case. The lack 
of choice argument applies equally to all acts of conscientious objection and to all 
kinds of conscience. It does not result in favouritism towards either capricious 
passions or proclivities of the least reasonable – or the sincere, serious (ex post) 
reflective moral commitments of the more reasonable. Furthermore, we do not 
suggest that the fact that people are compelled by their conscience to act denies their 
legal responsibility. We do not suggest using the lack of choice argument as a legal 
trump card (e.g. as a sufficient reason for establishing a defence within the context of 
criminal law or for granting conscientious exemption). All we argue is that the lack of 
choice argument should always be added to the balance of reasons when we need to 
decide whether to tolerate conscientious objection.  
At this point one may argue that our view about ‘lack of choice as a reason for 
																																								 																				
66 Brownlee (n 8) 170. Brownlee makes her arguments within the context of what she refers to as civil 
disobedience. However, Brownlee’s perception of what civil disobedience is differs from the common 
definition of the term and is in fact closer to what we call here ‘conscientious objection’.    
	48 	
	
tolerance’ is in tension with the general view that we have about the possibility of 
many of us, and especially conscientious objectors, not being reasons-responsive 
agents. What would be the point, one may ask, of making normative arguments in a 
determinist world? However, the fact that our previous arguments may depend (in 
part and to a limited extent) on incompatible determinism, does not, of course, prevent 
us from suggesting that the lack of choice argument should always be added to the 
balance of reasons when we need to decide whether to tolerate conscientious 
objection. More generally, it does not prevent us from providing reasons to be tolerant 
or from providing reasons for acting in any other way. All it means is that when we 
think that the lack of choice is always a reason for tolerance – we think that because 
of reasons beyond our control. We succeeded or failed in establishing this argument 
because of the skills that we have but never chose to have or acquire. Others may or 
may not be persuaded by our argument because of reasons beyond their control. More 
generally, subscribing to incompatible determinism does mean that making normative 
arguments is pointless or at odds with incompatible determinism itself. All it means is 
that the likelihood that these arguments will be persuasive depends on factors beyond 
our control.   
4.	Conclusion	
   
To briefly recap, in this article we have argued, and contrary to the common view, 
that the concept of autonomy or autonomous choice does not provide a sound basis 
for tolerating conscientious objections. This is because the decisions made on foot of 
conscientious commitments are not made on the basis of meaningful choice. Rather, 
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our conscience dictates and determines particular choices, whilst closing off almost all 
other possible choices. Likewise, the development of conscience is not something 
over which people exercise autonomous control. This argument then has two major 
implications. Analytically, it implies that the best explanation for what it is we are 
doing when we tolerate conscientious objectors is that we are acknowledging their 
lack of autonomous choice. Normatively, it suggests that the lack of autonomous 
choice provides a reason for tolerating conscientious objections, and that this reason 
stems from the special harm to moral integrity and personhood that is done by failing 
to act in accordance with one’s non-chosen conscience. However, the normative 
implications of this argument should not be overstated: it provides a reason for 
toleration, not necessarily a decisive or overwhelming reason for toleration. 
 
 
 
	
